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ever, the court stated it rejected them as a basis for making its decision 27
and instead construed the Florida statutory definition of "motor vehicles"28
by utilizing the Wisconsin statutory rule 29 of interpreting words and
phrases according to common and approved usage. This approach of the
court is in complete accord with the opinion of the McBoyle case, which
the court cited as final support for its conclusion.
In view of the decisions of the two cases on point,30 the result reached
by the Wisconsin court was correct. However, the decision could have
had stronger support, as it was rendered without regard for either of these
decisions. The opinion also failed to take into consideration the expression
of the 1949 Florida Legislature not to consider airplanes as motor vehicles.
This was shown by the enactment of a separate section in the Florida
Statutes to deal with crimes in the operation of airplanes rather than
include them in the section dealing with motor vehicle crimesA1 With
the ever increasing use of private aircraft in Florida, it is ventured that
the Florida courts will have this question to decide in the very near future.
It is probable that the aforementioned act of the Florida Legislature will
be of foremost importance in the decision rendered. However, this question
could become moot if the Florida Legislature would enact an aircraft
statute similar to its guest statute governing motor vehicles as already
enacted by several states.32
MARVIN H. GILLMAN
NEGLIGENCE: NOTARY'S LIABILITY TO BENEFICIARY
OF INVALID WILL - ABSENCE OF PRIVITY
A notary public prepared a testamentary instrument which named
plaintiff as sole beneficiary and failed to have it properly attested, which
resulted in its invalidity and denial of probate. The intended beneficiary
27. 3 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1958) "they seem to us so evenly
balanced that collectively they are of little help."
28. FLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 320.01 (1) (1957) 'Motor vehicle" includes automobiles,
motorcycles, motor trucks and all other vehicles operated over the public highways and
streets of this state ....-
29. Wis. STAT. tit. L., § 990.01 (1) (1957) "All words and phrases shall be
construed according to common and approved usage; . (Also applied in Florida by
court decision. E.g., Caulden v. Kirk, 47 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1950).
30. In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Hanson v. Lewis,
11 Ohio Op. 42, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 105 (C.P. 1937).
31. FLA. STAT. § 860.13 (1957).
32. CAL. Poa. UTIL. ConE § 21406; SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15 ,§ 22.83 (1951); BuRNxs INn. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 924 (1957); NEv. REV. STAT. ch.
41.190 (1957); Owo REV. CODE ANN. tit. 45, ch. 4561.151 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT.
tit. 3, ch. 30.120 (1957); CODE o LAws OF S.C. tit. 2, § 21 (1952); S.D. CODE
tit. 2, ch. 203, § 2.0310 (1952); UTAn CODE ANN. tit. 2, ch. 1, § 33 (1957); Mica.
Pua. ACTS No. 114, § 259.180a, at 121 (1958).
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brought an action for negligence against the notary. Held, the failure of
the notary to have the instrument properly attested constituted actionable
negligence and rendered him liable to the beneficiary notwithstanding the
absence of privity of contract. Biankania v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320
P. 2d 16 (1958).
More than a century ago in Winterbottom v. Wright,' it was held
that the duty of care of a contracting party was limited by privity. In
the past this rule has been closely followed;2 however, the trend is toward
liability where injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.3 Since
the turn of the century, liability has been imposed in the absence of
privity, where the injury was personal4 or to a property5 interest. The
imposition of liability for injuries to an economic interest, although often
1. [18421 10 NI. & \V. 109, 111, 11 L. J. Ex. 415, 416, "it is the general rule,
that wherever a wrong arises merely out of the breach of a contract, ... whether the
form in which the action is conceived bc ex contractu or ex delicto, the party who made
the contract alone can sue. If the rule were otherwise, and privity of contract were
not requisite, there would be no limit to such actions. If the plaintiff may, . . . run
through the length of three contracts, lie may run through any number or series of
them; and the most alarming consequences would follow the adoption of such a
principle. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into
the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go
fifty." (Emphasis added.)
2. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895); Michel v. Murphy, 147
Cal. App.2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957); Moch Co. v. Rencselaer Water Co., 247
N.Y. 160, 168, 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928), "Everyone making a promise having the
quality of a contract is under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but
is not under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential
beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation cannot
mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked
together. The law does not spread its protection so far." (Emphasis added.); Robertson
v. Fleming, [18611 4 Macq. If. L. Cas. 167 at 167, 1 Paterson 1057, 1058, concerning
the liability of an attorney to the legatee, for having negligently prepared a will, the
court said: "He only who by himself or another, as his agent, employs the attorney
to do the particular act in which the alleged neglect has taken place, can sue him for
that neglect .. 
3. Stroud v. Southern Oil Transp. Co., 215 N.C. 726, 3 S.E.2d 297 (1939),
a truck owner could have foreseen injury to a service station attendant resulting from
the dangerous condition of his truck wheels; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). "''lhe presence of a known danger,
attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a duty. We have put aside the notion that
the duty. to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may beforeseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the
obligation where it ought to be. 'We have put its source in the law."
4. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (building contractor);
Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal.2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1931) (manufacturer
of ladders); Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932) (elevator
maintenance company); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050(1916) (automobile manufacturer); see PRossa, TORTS (2d ed. 1955).
5. Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 93 Cal. App. 609, 269 Pac. 975 (1928)(damage to orange trees); Brown v. Bigelow, 325 Mass. 4, 88 N.E.2d 542 (1949);
Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929) (damage to livestock); Dunn
v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, S.W.2d 479 (1943) (damage to livestock);
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 \Vis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952); see PROSSER,
'I'oRTs 501 (2d ed. 1955).
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allowed,6 has been refused where the third party's interest was incidental7
or his existence unknown prior to the injury.8
The California Supreme Court in Buckley v. Gray,O held that an
attorney, who negligently drew a will, was not liable to a disappointed
beneficiary, due to lack of privity. Other cases involving the negligence
of attorneys and notaries in preparing testamentary instruments have
also adopted this rule.10 In Biankania v. Irving," however, the court
refused to follow this authority and allowed recovery to the intended
beneficiary. 12 The notary in preparing the will was engaged in the un-
authorized practice of law;13 however, this was not relied on to establish
6. Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930),
a trustee who negligently certified corporate bonds was liable to good faith purchasers;
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), a public weigher was liable
to a buyer for an error in weighing though there was no contract between them; Dickel
v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890); Anderson v. Spriesters-
bach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912), abstracter liable to third person whom he
knew would rely on his statement; RESTATEMFNT, TORTS § 552, comment f (1938);
accord, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bowman, 141 Ala. 175, 37 So. 493 (1904); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. McKibben, 114 Ind. 511, 14 N.E. 894 (1887); McPherson v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 189 Mich. 71, 155 N.W. 557 (1915); Barker v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 134 Vis. 147, 114 N.W. 439 (1908).
7. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), a public
accountant was liable only to those persons who engaged his professional services.
8. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d
1065 (1934), a third party, whose existence was unknown to abstracter at the time he
issued the abstract of title, could not sue for abstracter's negligence in preparing the
abstract;. MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 289 Ill. App. 59, 6 N.E.
2d 526 (1937), newspaper held not liable for injuries.to reader resulting from the use
of a formula for dandruff remedy recomhnded in a newspaper article; Ohmart v.
Citizens' Savings & Trust Co., 82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N.E. 577 (1924) (abstracter
not liable to subsequent purchaser for defects in abstract); Jaillet v. Cashman, 235
N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923), a company which published ticker-tapes was deemed
to have the same relation to the public as the publisher of a newspaper and was not
liable to one with whom it had no contract or fiduciary relationship for an unintentional
mistake in its report.
9. Buckley v. Cray, 110 Cal. 339, 344, 42 Pac. 900, 901 (1895), in holding
that an attorney, who negligently drew a will, was not liable to a disappointed bene-
ficiary, the court said: "The limit of the doctrine relating to actionable negligence,
is that the person occasioning the loss must owe a duty, arising from contract or other-
wise, to the person sustaining such loss. Such a restriction on the right to sue for a
want of care in the exercise of employments or the transaction of business is plainly
necessary to restrain the remedy from being pushed to an impracticable extreme.
There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of the
negligence of men may be followed down the chain of results to the final effect."
(Emphasis added.)
10. Miekel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App.2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957), a notary
public, who prepared a will, and negligently failed tq have it properly attested, was not
liable to the intended beneficiary, due to lack of privity; Robertson v. Fleming, [18613
4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 167, 1 Paterson 1057 (attorney); Re Fitzpatrick, [1923] 54
Ont. L.R. 3, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 981 (1924).
11. 49 Cal. App.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
12. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
13. Biankanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. App.2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958),
the CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODz § 6125, provides as follows: "No person shall practice
law in this State unless he is an active member of the State Bar"; § 6126, "any person
advertising himself as practicing or entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing
law, . . . who is not an active member of the State Bar, is guilty of a misdemeanor."-
People v, Woodall, 128 Cal. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1954), bank cashier, who prepared
and caused a will to be executed, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
People v. Hanna, 127 Cal. 481, 258 P.2d 492 (1953), a public stenographer, who
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the basis for liability.14 The court, motivated by equitable considerations,
based its decision primarily on public policy, together with the degree
of negligence of the notary and the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.5
The effect of the instant case, is a further "assault upon the citadel of
privity."' 6 In its inception, the requirement of privity was intended to
prevent a multiplicity of suits by strangers, following the breach of a
contractual duty.17 The instant case is one in a series, involving economic
interests, which depart from the older rule and allow recovery in the
absence of privity. 18
Writers, 19 who have interpreted the Biankanja decision as overruling
Buckley,20 and having laid the foundation for liability of attorneys in the
future for similar negligent acts, are in error. The holding in Biankania
did not mitigate an attorney's right to the defense of privity. It is generally
held that a layman performing professional services is not liable if he
complies with the standard of care required by the profession.21 The court
was most emphatic and clear in holding that the notary, in performing
the functions of an attorney, did not maintain the standard of care neces-
sary to avail himself of civil immunity.22 Limitations on liability, such as
privity, are extended to certain persons upon whom the public is dependent.
A lawyer or acountant could not engage in their professions if services,
which rendered a reasonable commission, potentially subjected them to
prepared a will for a fee, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; People v.
Newer, 125 Cal. 304, 242 P.2d 615 (1952), a layman, who drew a will and accepted
compensation therefor, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; cf. People v.
Merchants' Protective Corp. 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); People v. Sipper,
61 Cal. App. 2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v, Denkema, 290
Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1948); State v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172, 156 P.2d 309 (1945).
14. Biankanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. App.2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
15. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d. at 19.
16. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931),
the trend toward a mitigation of the privity doctrine was well recognized by Cardozo,
C. J.: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace. How
far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical discussion." (Emphasis
added.)
17. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895); Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Winterbottom v. Wright, [18421
10 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415.
18. Cases cited note 6 wupra.
19. See Notes, 27 FoRDIAI L. REV. 290, 293 (1958), 9 HASTINcs L.J. 330,
333 (1958), 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 681, 682 (1958).
20. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
21. Kelly v. Carrol, 36 Wash.2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950), an unlicensed drugless
healer was adjudged as if he were a doctor where he assumed to act as one; cf. Johnston
v. Black Co., 33 Cal. App. 363, 91 P.2d 921 (1939) (unlicensed nurse); Lexchin v.
Mathews, 269 Mich. 120, 256 N.W. 825 (1934) (unlicensed osteopath); Janssen v.
Mulder, 232 Mich, 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925) (unlicensed chiropractor); Brown v.
Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) (unlicensed chiropractor); Rudman v.
Bancheri, 260 App. Div. 957, 23 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1940) (unlicensed pharmacist); Crier
v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d 485 (1949) (unlicensed dentist); Hardy v. Dahl,
210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936) (unlicensed naturopath). Contra, Thomas v. Studio
Amusements, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 2d 538, 123 P.2d 552 (1942).
22. Biankanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. App.2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
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infinite liability. -3 Jurisprudence does not sanction the rendering of legal
sen'ices by unauthorized persons. Consequently, the court in the present
decision defined the peril at which one acts when he undertakes to
perform a professional service for which he is not qualified.
RICHARD MULHOLLAND
23. Ultramares Corp. v. lottche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, (1931),
in holding an attorney not liable for losses resulting from a negligently made certificate,
the court said: "Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many
callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers, who certify their opinion as to the validity of
municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to
the notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked
a statute or decision, .... " (Emphasis added.); accord, Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339.
42 Pac. 900, 901 (1895). See textual material supra note Q.
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